Can beneficial ends justify morally questionable means? To investigate how monetary outcomes influence the neural responses to lying, we used a modified, cheap talk sender-receiver game in which participants were the direct recipients of lies and truthful statements resulting in either beneficial or harmful monetary outcomes. Both truth-telling (versus lying) as well as beneficial (versus harmful) outcomes elicited higher activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). Lying (versus truth-telling) elicited higher activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and left anterior insula (AI).
Introduction
It is debated extensively as to whether lying can be morally acceptable under specific circumstances, e.g. if beneficial ends can justify morally questionable means. Kantian moral theory suggests that telling a lie is never morally permissible, regardless of the outcome (Kant, 1797) . However, the utilitarianism school of thought implies that lying is morally right if it produces more total welfare than any other act could have (Carson, 2010) . From the perspective of decision makers who decide whether to lie and benefit more, accumulating evidence suggests people encounter a utility loss due to deception (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) , which runs against assumptions of the classic approach in economics that people are selfish and lying does not carry any cost (Crawford and Howell, 1998) . One behavioral study found that a significant fraction of people chose the materially advantageous allocation more often in a dictator game than in a deception game (Gneezy, 2005) , supporting the idea of an lying aversion parameter significantly influencing individual utility. Participants have also been shown to be more likely to avoid settings enabling them to deceive others, compared to the settings which do not enable deception, suggesting the temptation to lie triggers anticipated moral emotion to a greater extent (Shalvi et al., 2011) . Even in situations where lies benefit both self and others, participants were still reluctant to lie (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) . This is again in line with the intuition of an aversion to lie, i.e. a dislike for lies independent of the consequences (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2012) .
From the perspective of individuals who are the recipients of lies (i.e. being lied to), how do the consequences influence the process of lies and truth? To investigate this question, one can confront the participants with several scenarios which contain lying or truth-telling behaviors, then ask them to provide moral judgments. It is the typical paradigm researchers used to investigate the neural patterns underlying moral judgment of deception by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques Hayashi et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011; Hayashi et al., 2014) . However, the existing affect might be altered if participants are interrupted with questions and required to report their feelings or judgments (Knutson et al., 2014) . What's more, it has been argued that a third-party judgment might not be emotionally arousing and instead more involve rational processing (Wu et al., 2011) which might induce higher involvement of prefrontal areas (Abe et al., 2014; Hayashi et al., 2014) . According to the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) , moral judgment is the result of a quick "gut" feeling.
Moral reasoning helps people to justify their intuitive responses, to share their judgment with others, or to be relied upon when no initial or conflicted intuitions exist (Schnall et al., 2008) .
Therefore, moral reasoning might also play a role in moral judgment tasks. Finally, the neural patterns differed when comparing the affective reaction of being deceived to the affective reaction of watching others being deceived . In a study conducted by Grezes et al. , participants watched videos of actors (either themselves or others) lifting a box. They then determined whether or not the actors had been misled as to the actual weight of the box. Activation in the amygdala and fusiform gyrus was only found in the condition that the participants themselves being deceived. Since moral judgment tasks during the experiment might bring confounds (i.e. interrupting the mental process) and personal involvement is crucial, in the current study we would like to investigate the neural responses to moral behaviors from the perspective of the recipients without using an explicit moral judgment task during the scanning.
However, little is known about the neural response to the passive reception of lying and truthtelling. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has investigated how monetary consequences influence the judgment of deception from the perspective of the recipients themselves. In previous studies about neural responses to lies and truth, the participants were neither the direct recipients of lying and truth-telling (e.g. reading scenarios), nor did they experience lying and truth-telling with different outcomes. Therefore, our experiment utilized a modified sender-receiver game (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) in which participants were the direct recipients (i.e. message receivers) of truthful or deceptive statements sent by other players (i.e. message senders). The sender chose to send a message indicating the roll of a die which represented one of two payoff options for both the sender and the receiver. In the original setting, if the receiver chose the actual outcome of the die roll, the corresponding option would be implemented. Otherwise, an alternative option would be implemented. In our modified version, if a receiver did not believe the sender's message, both the receiver and the sender received a minimum payoff, which makes believing the sender's message be the dominant strategy for the receiver. This setting was applied to avoid confounding factors, such as extra processes of generating strategies or feelings of regret due to bad choices, which might influence the neural response to moral behaviors. When following the sender's information, the receiver faces four possible situations: the beneficial lies situation, in which the information is deceptive and both players earn more money than in the alternative option; the beneficial truth situation, in which the information is truthful and both players earn more money than in the alternative option; the harmful lies situation, in which the information is deceptive, the sender earns more money and the participant earns less money than in the alternative option; and the harmful truth situation, in which the information is truthful, the sender earns more money and the participant earns less money compared to the alternative option.
Mainly two clusters of brain regions might be critically involved, based on previous literatures.
First, the manipulation of monetary outcomes might modulate reward associated region. The nucleus accumbens (NAcc) is a key structure that is linked to the anticipation of rewards, independent of the kind of incentive, such as monetary benefits (Delgado et al., 2000; Berns et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a; Knutson et al., 2001b; O'Doherty, 2004; Bartra et al., 2013) or social reward (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009; Häusler et al., 2015) . Second, being the recipient of deception might be associated with regions which have been consistently found to relate to moral sensitivity (i.e. the detection and interpretation of moral situations or issues (Rest et al., 1999) ), including the superior temporal sulcus, insula and limbic regions (especially the amygdala) (Robertson et al., 2007) . Intriguingly, two influential human moral theories lead to different predictions. Given the Kantian moral theory, both types of lies regardless of their outcomes should be equally treated as less permissible and less rewarding compared to truth-telling, which could lead to lower activities in reward-related regions (esp.
NAcc) but higher activities in regions related to moral sensitivity. Alternatively, according to utilitarianism theory, we could expect increased NAcc activation in the beneficial lie condition but decreased activities in moral sensitivity related regions in beneficial lies (versus harmful lies), since beneficial lies would be considered as rewarding and morally permissible.
Methods

Participants
In the experiment, participants were divided into two groups: senders and receivers. Prior to the fMRI experiment, we invited 86 participants to play the game online as senders. Forty-one participants were enrolled as receivers in the fMRI part of the experiment. Data from three subjects were excluded due to excessive head movements (i.e. > 3 mm). The remaining 38 participants (22 females) ranged from 19 to 32 years of age (mean ± SD = 24 ± 3.24 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no prior history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. All participants provided their informed consent and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn.
Tasks
In this experiment, we used a modified sender-receiver game with real incentives (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) (Fig. 1) . The sender's task was to send a message to the receiver and the receiver's task was to decide whether or not to follow the sender's message. For each round, the outcome of the die roll corresponded to one of two payment options. From six possible message choices, the senders sent a message to anonymous receivers: "The outcome of the die roll is x"
(where x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6). Before the fMRI experiment, we collected the decisions from 86 senders in advance (Fig. 1 A) and they earned 5€ for their participation.
In the fMRI experiment, 41 participants were invited to play the game as receivers. Before starting, the receivers completed a manipulation check to ensure that they fully understood the experiment. Importantly, the receivers were told that when the senders made the decisions, they knew all the information beforehand, unlike the receivers. During scanning ( Fig. 1 B and Fig. 1 C), in each round the receiver first saw the message (e.g., "Message from L.Y.: 'The outcome of the die roll is 4'."). This message was sent from one of the 86 senders. On the same screen, the receiver would also see the phrase "Believe?" and choose to believe or not believe the sender's messages by choosing either the "Yes" or "No" option. The position of "Yes" and "No" option was counterbalanced on the left and right side of the screen. After the receiver made a decision, the next screen displayed two payoff options and the actual outcome of the die roll. The receiver then discovered whether or not the sender sent a truthful message. If the receiver believed the sender's message and the message matched the outcome of the die roll (i.e. a truthful message), the payment option which the die represents would be implemented. If the receiver believed the untruthful message which did not match the number of the die roll, the other payment option would be implemented (Fig. 1 B) . If the receiver did not believe, both the receiver and the sender earned 1€ for that round (Fig. 1 C) .
In each round, for both the sender and the receiver, the payoff in the implemented option was one of three monetary amounts (4€, 8€ or 12€). In the other option, the payoff for the receiver was increased or decreased by 25% or 75% and the payoff for the sender was decreased by 25% or 75% compared to the payoff in the implemented option (to check the payoff structure, see Table   1 ). We used 2 (means: lies and truth) by 2 (ends: benefit and harm) within subject factorial design and there were four experimental conditions: beneficial lies, beneficial truth, harmful lies and harmful truth. Under lying conditions, the sender sent an incorrect message; under truthful conditions, the sender sent the correct message; under beneficial conditions, the receiver's final payment was higher than the payment in the other option; and under harmful conditions, the receiver's final payment was lower than the payment in the other option. There were 36 rounds for each condition and 144 rounds total were played. After the experiment, the computer randomly chose one of the rounds to be implemented as the final payment for the senders and the receivers. The receivers earned an extra 10€ for their participation. The entire experiment lasted about 40 minutes.
In order to measure the emotional valence and moral acceptance toward the four different conditions presented in the experiment, the participants were asked to rate the emotional valence according to Lang's Self-Assessment-Manikin Valence Scale (Lang, 1980) and then rate moral acceptance according to a nine-level valence scale (1: not acceptable at all, 5: neutral, 9: extremely acceptable) after completing the experiment. The Self-Assessment Manikin scale of a nine-level valence scale (1: very unhappy, 5: neural, 9: very happy) was adapted from PXLab (Irtel, 2008) .
Image acquisition and data analysis
All images were acquired on a Siemens Trio 3.0-Tesla scanner with a standard 32-channel head coil. Structural scans included T1-weighted images (TR = 1660 ms; TE = 2.75 ms; flip angle = 9°; slice thickness = 0.8 mm). One functional session was run which started with a localizer scan and was then followed by the paradigm implemented in presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems; http://www.neurobs.com) during which T2*-weighted echo planar images were collected (TR = 2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°; 37 slices with 3mm slice thickness; 96 × 96 acquisition matrix; field of view =192 mm × 192 mm; voxel size = 2 × 2 × 3 mm 3 ).
SPM8 was adopted for fMRI data analysis ( 
Results
Behavioral results
For the emotional valence, we performed a 2 (means: lying and truth-telling) × 2 (ends: beneficial and harmful outcome) ANOVA (Fig. 2 A) . Significant main effects of means (truth-telling > lying; F (1, 37) = 80.50, p < 0.001) and ends (beneficial outcome > harmful outcome; F (1, 37) = 15.59, p < 0.001) and a significant means × ends interaction (F (1, 37) = 5.66, p = 0.02) were found. Post hoc analysis showed that emotional valences were significantly higher (p = 0.005) for the beneficial truth condition (mean ± SD: 7.79 ± 1.43) than for the beneficial lies condition (7.05 ± 1.73) and were significantly higher (p < 0.001) for the harmful truth condition (5.55 ± 1.63) than for the harmful lies condition (4.24 ± 1.85). The differences between valences of harmful truth versus the harmful lies condition (mean ± SD: 1.32 ± 1.97) were significantly higher (p = 0.02) than the differences between valences of beneficial truth versus beneficial lies (mean ± SD: 0.74 ± 1.53).
For the moral acceptance, we performed the same ANOVA (Fig. 2 B) . The mean ratings and standard deviations of moral acceptance of beneficial lies, beneficial truth, harmful lies and harmful truth were: 6.97 ± 2.03, 8.34 ± 1.12, 4.58 ± 2.16 and 6.61 ± 2.04. Significant main effects of means (truth-telling > lying; F (1, 37) = 75.39, p < 0.001) and ends (beneficial outcome > harmful outcome; F (1, 37) = 32.34, p < 0.001) were found. The interaction showed only a trend (p = 0.08).
The emotional valence and moral acceptance ratings were significantly correlated (beneficial lies: r = 0.84, p < 0.001; beneficial truth: r = 0.69, p < 0.001; harmful lies: r = 0.69, p < 0.001; harmful truth: r = 0.54, p < 0.001). There were no significant gender differences in the ratings.
Functional MRI results
The results are listed in Table 2 . Beneficial outcome elicited stronger activation in the bilateral nucleus accumbens (NAcc) compared to harmful outcome (Fig. 3 A) . The opposite comparison yielded no results. Truth elicited stronger activation in the left NAcc compared to lies (Fig. 3 B) .
Compared to the truth, lies were associated with stronger brain activation in the right superior temporal sulcus (STS), left supplementary motor area (SMA), left anterior insula (AI) and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; Fig. 4 A) . The BOLD percentage signal change for all four conditions was extracted from the left NAcc (overlapping region of both contrasts of truth vs. lies and beneficial vs. harmful outcome; Fig. 3 C) , SMA (Fig. 4 B) , right IFG (Fig. 4 C) , left AI (Fig. 4 D) and right STS (Fig. 4 E) . No significant interaction of (beneficial lies -harmful lies) vs.
(beneficial truth -harmful truth) was found. The other interaction effect (beneficial truthharmful truth) vs. (beneficial lies -harmful lies) was found in the left amygdala (small-volume correction; p < 0.05, FWE correction; Fig. 5 A) . Further analysis of the left amygdala showed that there were significant differences in brain activity in the contrasts of beneficial truth versus harmful truth (Fig. 5 B ; p = 0.02) as well as beneficial truth versus beneficial lies (p < 0.001). No significant differences were found in the contrasts of beneficial lies versus harmful lies as well as harmful lies versus harmful truth (Fig. 5 B; ps ≥ 0.08). There were no significant gender differences in any of the four conditions.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate how beneficial or harmful outcomes influence the neural responses of the recipients to lying and truth-telling. Our results showed that the neural responses to lying and truth-telling were modulated by whether the behavior leads to beneficial or harmful monetary outcomes. First, both contrasts of truth versus lies and beneficial versus harmful outcomes activated the left nucleus accumbens (NAcc; Fig. 3 ). Second, in contrast to truth-telling condition, lying was associated with higher activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and left anterior insula (AI).
Third, the left amygdala showed significant interaction effect (i.e. (beneficial truth -harmful truth) vs. (beneficial lies -harmful lies)). Further analysis revealed that monetary outcomes only modulated the activity of the left amygdala toward truth-telling (i.e. beneficial outcome increased the amygdala activity), without affecting the response of the amygdala toward lying.
In our results, we found that both contrasts of truth versus lies and beneficial versus harmful outcomes showed higher activation in the NAcc (Fig. 3) . Furthermore, no positive NAcc activity linked to beneficial lying was found. The NAcc has been implicated in the processing of monetary rewards (Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Sabatinelli et al., 2007) and social rewards (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009; Häusler et al., 2015) . In our study, the enhanced activity in the NAcc was not only found in the comparison of beneficial versus harmful outcomes, but also observed in comparing truth-telling to lying. But to our knowledge, activation in the NAcc has not been found in previous studies which investigated the judgment or the reception of lying and truth-telling (Grezes et al., 2004a; Grezes et al., 2004b; Berthoz et al., 2006; Grezes et al., 2006; Hayashi et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011; Hayashi et al., 2014) . One possible explanation is that in these previous studies, participants served as third-party observers and provided explicit judgments. More rational judgment/reasoning processes and the lack of personal involvement might dampen the neural activity in the regions which are associated with reward processing. In the interactive game (prisoner's dilemma game), the NAcc was activated when participants were seeing the faces of intentional cooperators compared to neutral faces or nonintentional cooperators (Singer et al., 2004a) . In the neuroimaging studies of deceiving others, the successful deception (vs. truth-telling) elicited stronger activations in the ventral striatum (Sun et al., 2015) . The findings in the NAcc were in accordance with previous fMRI findings on monetary incentives and social favorable behavior which are experienced as rewarding. Our results further suggest that compared to truth-telling, lying is experienced as less rewarding even when it comes with beneficial outcomes.
When comparing lying to truth-telling, significant activation was found in the left AI, SMA, right STS and IFG (Fig. 4) . The insula has been found to be implicated in multiple domains, such as perceptual decision making (Binder et al., 2004; Thielscher and Pessoa, 2007) , deceptive decision making (Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014) , and empathy (Singer et al., 2004b; Jackson et al., 2005) . Due to its involvement in a wide range of domains, the anterior insula (AI) has been thought to play a fundamental role in awareness (Craig, 2009) or general arousal (Singer et al., 2009) . Note that in our experiment, participants showed significantly less positive valence toward lying. It is possible that the negative affect toward lying might cause the higher activity in the AI. The results from previous studies revealed the involvement of the insula in processing negative events, such as experience of monetary loss (O'Doherty et al., 2003) , disgust (Calder et al., 2000) , aversion (Paulus et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2011) , and negative arousal (Paulus and Stein, 2006) . For example, activation in the AI was found while participants were faced with unfair offers, and positively correlated with the propensity to reject unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003) . Patients with insula lesions showed impairment for the perception and experience of disgust (Sprengelmeyer, 2007) . The tendency to accept unfair proposals was associated with decreased activity in the AI which has been implicated in negative affect (Tabibnia et al., 2008) .
Nevertheless, findings about association between activations in brain regions and multiple emotions do not support a simple one-to-one mappings between emotions and brain regions (Hamann, 2012) and the activation alone might provide little information about the underlying mental state (Poldrack, 2006; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013) . Besides the AI, we also found that the right IFG was activated in the contrast of lying versus truth-telling. The right IFG has been typically related to response inhibition tasks (Aron et al., 2004 ) and proposed as a brake which functions in different modes and in different contexts (Aron et al., 2014) . Previous deception studies where participants were instructed to lie showed that the IFG and insula are two of the regions which were consistently more active for deceptive responses compared to honest responses (Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014) . Deception-related activity in the IFG and insula overlapped with more than one of the ALE maps for working memory, inhibitory control and task switching and therefore were believed to be associated with generally executive control (Christ et al., 2009) . However, several limitations are integral parts of the instructed paradigms such as poor ecological validity (Ganis and Keenan, 2009) or different involvement of emotions and cognitive control from that in real life (Farah et al., 2014) . Thus, the function of the insula and IFG as speculated from the instructed paradigms might differ in the paradigms which allow participants to make their own choices. In the studies where participants chose to lie on their own initiatives (i.e. spontaneous deception), the IFG was found activated when making deceptive responses (Sip et al., 2013) and also when deciding how to respond regardless of the choice made (Sip et al., 2012) .
Together with the insula, the hyper-activation in the IFG were consistently found to be associated with anxiety and stress (Etkin and Wager, 2007) . In addition, increased activity in the IFG correlated with higher aversion to risk (Christopoulos et al., 2009) . One potential explanation is that the negative emotion or aversion to certain contexts or behaviors elicits higher activation in the IFG and AI. By using resting electroencephalography, researchers found that the higher baseline activation in the AI is, the lower participants' propensity to lie in the trust game (Baumgartner et al., 2013) . This suggests aversion to lying might rely upon the AI and associated networks. In a trust game, participants (in the role of trustees) first could either make a promise about paying back money or have no chance to make any promise. They then waited for an investor's decision about trusting or not, and decided to pay back or keep the money (Baumgartner et al., 2009) . In dishonest participants, promise giving (versus the no promise giving condition) elicited increased right AI and IFG activity during the promise stage, whereas the no promise giving condition elicited higher AI and IFG activity during the anticipation stage.
The authors speculated that the former was associated with aversive emotional experiences of providing mislead promise and the latter was due to the anticipation of negative and unforeseeable emotional events. Taken together, the negative emotion or aversion to lying might be associated with the AI and IFG.
The contrast of lying versus truth-telling also activated the STS, which is critical in social perception, i.e. the evaluation of the social communicative intentions of others extracted from gaze, facial expression, body gesture and motions (Pelphrey et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2005) . The posterior STS might be also critical to moral sensitivity (Robertson et al., 2007) . The posterior STS has been found more active when judging the facial trustworthiness (Bzdok et al., 2011) , viewing moral pictures (Harenski and Hamann, 2006) and making moral judgment (Moll et al., 2002; Greene et al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2005; Sevinc and Spreng, 2014) . In previous deception studies, the activation in the STS was also observed when the participants judged the behaviors as misleading (Grezes et al., 2004b; Grezes et al., 2006) . The recognition-related increases for morally transgressive behaviors (e.g. lying) might explain the higher activation in the STS (Robertson et al., 2007) .
The interaction results showed that the amygdala activity was significantly increased by the beneficial outcome under truthful rather than lying conditions (Fig. 5) . At least two alternative explanations of the findings in the amygdala are feasible. The first explanation would be: the stronger deactivation in the amygdala might be caused by the involvement of emotional regulation. Previous findings have suggested a specific role of the left amygdala in cognitive and intentional control of mood. With the use of real time fMRI (rtfMRI) neurofeedback from the amygdala, patients with major depressive disorder learned to up-regulate the amygdala activation (i.e. a significant BOLD signal increase during training) resulting in increased ratings of happiness and decreased ratings of depression and anxiety (Young et al., 2014) . It can also enhance participants' ability to down-regulate the amygdala activity (i.e. decreasing activity) while being stimulated with negative emotional faces (Brühl et al., 2014) . The reduction of the amygdala response was then speculated as one aspect of successful emotion regulation. The meta-analyses in brain regions associated with fear extinction, placebo and cognitive emotion regulation where participants successfully diminished negative affect, showed hypo-activations in the left amygdala (Diekhof et al., 2011) . Another meta-analysis identified that activity in the amygdala decreased in the presence of reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014) . In an imaging study applying painful stimuli, the deactivation of the amygdala was found during experiencing pain (Petrovic et al., 2004) . This might reflect a regulation process of subjective distress while facing an aversive context.
We speculate that the significant decreases in the amygdala when participants were facing a harmful outcome and lying behavior might be due to the higher involvement of emotional regulation. First, the regulation of negative emotions toward losses might decrease the amygdala activity. Previous study found that successfully regulating loss aversion reduces amygdala responses to loss but not gain outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012) . Second, moral transgression might also reduce amygdala responses. The amygdala showed significantly less activity compared to baseline in response to unfair offers (Tabibnia et al., 2008) . Therefore, decreased amygdala responses might be associated with emotion regulation of the more emotionally aversive and less morally acceptable means and outcomes. Nevertheless, our study does not provide direct experimental evidence for this explanation. Participants were neither instructed to modulate their mood nor asked to report the strategies/existence of emotion regulation after the experiment.
Alternatively, the increased activity in the amygdala while encountering beneficial truth-telling might also be explained as the consequence of the increase of reward. The amygdala is thought to play a major role in the perception and production of negative emotion or affect (Öhman and Mineka, 2001; Phelps et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2006) . In previous neuroimaging studies addressing the judgment of lying and truth-telling behaviors, the amygdala was found to be more active when participants thought they themselves were being deceived by the experimenter and it was more active toward the participants' own moral violation . However, the amygdala is also involved in the processes of stimuli with positive valence and reward (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Murray, 2007; Anders et al., 2008; Ball et al., 2009; Morrison and Salzman, 2010) . In animal studies, selective amygdala lesions can affect the ability to associate stimuli with reward value (Gaffan et al., 1988; Cador et al., 1989; Holland and Gallagher, 1999) . In human studies, activity in the amygdala and the NAcc increased for both adolescents and adults when they were winning money (as opposed to not winning money) (Ernst et al., 2005) . Therefore, beneficial outcomes and morally favorable behavior (i.e. truth-telling) could increase reward which could further lead to higher activity in the amygdala. However, most deductions of the function of the amygdala come from the positive activation changes. Whether the payoff changes also modulate the amygdala's activity in the negative direction remains unclear. Further investigation is required in order to determine the role of the amygdala in the process of lying and truth-telling.
Beneficial outcomes did seem to make the dark side of lying less negative, supported by less valence difference between truth-telling and lying in the beneficial conditions as well as the increasing BOLD signal in the NAcc in the contrast of beneficial lies vs. harmful lies. This conflicts with the notion of Kant's absolute prohibition against lying. Lying might be sometimes permissible if the norm of not lying conflicts with a more important, or equally important, goal (e.g. to financially benefit the receivers in our experiment). Nevertheless, our results do not completely favor the utilitarianism theory which strongly permits lying. The moral acceptance ratings of lying behaviors were significantly less than those of truth-telling. What's more, we did not observe a specific rewarding effect of the influence of beneficial outcome to lying behavior.
But it is also possible that the monetary benefits offered in our experiment might be not sufficiently large enough to make lying rewarding. Nevertheless, lying might always have indirect bad consequences. In a broader sense, it would weaken one's reputation, and finally diminish the short-term benefits gained from lying (Carson, 2010) .
In conclusion, the beneficial or helpful outcomes modulated a network involving the NAcc, IFG/AI, STS and amygdala which linked to the reward process, recognition and emotional experiences of being treated (dis)honestly. Although the present study and findings do not settle the long debate of whether the ends can justify the means, it might provide us with hints about how the consequences of moral behaviors alter our attitude. Tool (Maldjian et al., 2003) ). Error bar denotes standard error of the mean (SE). Y.) sends the message: "The outcome of the die roll is 6" to a receiver (A). In the scanner, if the receiver believes the sender's messages (B), the other payment option would be implemented (the option within the yellow outlined frame). This example belongs to the beneficial lie condition. If the receiver does not believe (C), both the receiver and the sender earn 1€. The red and white bars respectively represent the payoff for the receiver and the sender. 180x127mm (300 x 300 DPI) .Voxels within the significant clusters were height thresholded at p < 0.001 (k = 10) and survived cluster-level p < 0.05 FWE correction. (C) Percentage signal changes were extracted from the overlap in left NAcc (yellow; masked with NAcc anatomical mask from WFU Pickatlas Tool (Maldjian et al., 2003) ). Error bar denotes standard error of the mean (SE). 85x73mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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